Freedomvrights.com

Writings and Publications by Joseph B. H. McMillan

Home

Articles

Books

Biography

Contact

 Origins of the Pursuit of Pleasure

by

Joseph B.H. McMillan

(Abridged extract from McMillan's book, Escaping Britain)

 

Introduction

In this paper I examine the philosophical origins of the modern Liberal Fundamentalist State.

I consider the jurisprudential aspects in a later paper.

I shall not at the outset attempt to define the Liberal Fundamentalist State. I am content to say that all Western democracies are, to lesser or greater degrees, such states.

By considering their philosophical origins, the analysis itself will speak to the principles to which such states subscribe today, and why they are properly called Liberal Fundamentalist. We shall see ourselves in the mirror as the analysis unfolds.

And, which is more important, the analysis will demonstrate why those principles rest on flimsy foundations.

But this paper is not, and does not hold itself out to be, a philosophical survey. For those who may have an appetite for such an investigation I would recommend Albert Schweitzer's two works, The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization(1), and Civilization and Ethics(2).

Now, before I attract the ridicule of 'true philosophers' for mentioning Schweitzer in the context of philosophy, let me say that I am aware that Schweitzer is not regarded as a 'true philosopher' because of his existentialist tendencies. When I appeal to Schweitzer on any matter, I do so, not in support of his ethic of "reverence for life" drawn from the "will-to-live", but in support of his description of the inadequate formulation of the absolute postulate to date.

The Absolute Postulate

Which brings me to the central issue: the absolute postulate. The Holy Grail of philosophy.

Identifying a definition of the absolute postulate can be a contentious issue in itself, but let me try.

In arithmetic, 2 + 3 = 5. It is a universally accepted principle of arithmetic that adding 2 pencils to 3 pencils will give me 5 pencils. It is the foundation of all financial systems. It is taught in schools as the most basic principle of mathematics. It is universally accepted, irrespective of where you go in the world. If you buy two items, whether in China, or America, or Peru, and one item costs 2 in the local currency, and the other item 3, the seller will expect 5. And no amount of abstract pontificating will persuade him otherwise.  

From that basic principle of addition, we extrapolate others. 2 x 3 doesn't equal 5, it equals 6. Because we use a short cut to add 3 to 3. And so a whole system of mathematics is built from humble beginnings, but beginnings that everyone can agree are valid.

The absolute postulate in philosophy is the same thing. It is the search for a basic principle which everyone can agree is valid, and doesn't require propping up by some other argument, from which can be derived a system of principles, or values, by which all can agree we should live.

Schweitzer put it this way. "In every effort of thought about ethics there is to be seen, distinctly or indistinctly, the search for a basic principle of morality, which needs no support outside itself, and unites in itself the sum total of all moral demands. But no one has ever succeeded in really formulating this principle."(3)

So what philosophers have been looking for is a fundamental principle, like that of mathematics, which can be programmed, like a calculator, so that when we are presented with a problem which we cannot immediately resolve, we can punch in the data, and eureka, out pops the answer.

It's really that simple! Although you wouldn't think so trying to wade through the endless waffle and linguistic gymnastics of philosophers.

Schweitzer, again, puts it like this. "The true basic principle of the ethical must be not only something universally valid, but something absolutely elementary and inward, which, once it has dawned upon a man, never relinquishes its hold, which as a matter of course runs like a thread through all his meditation, which never lets itself be thrust aside, and which continually challenges him to try conclusions with reality."(4)

Yes! A philosophical calculator.

But, I should caution, we must always be on our guard, when plunging into philosophy and jurisprudence, not to get caught in the barbed wire, or spider's web. Philosophical argument can get so complicated that it is easy to get trapped in it. The more you seek to argue your way out, the more entangled you get.

So I recommend a verse from Proverbs to keep us from getting snared. "Thorns and snares are in the way of the froward: he that doth keep his soul shall be far from them."(5)

"Froward", by the way, means turned away, perverse, unreasonable, going in the wrong direction. The opposite of toward.

So with Proverbs 22:5 to protect me, let me plunge into the jungle.

But to do so we need a kind of measuring rod, a test, to assess the various theories.

"Says who?". "Why?". And "What for?".

That would do for starters. The "Says who?" test.

The object of the test is to reduce assertions to their absolute basics. Once there, we can see whether they are actually nothing more than subjective speculations disguised as a universal principle, or absolute postulate, or whether they leave us no option but to agree.

In philosophical speak, determining whether someone is saying this 'ought' to be, rather than this 'is'.

Philosophers are very skillful at saying 2 + 3 'is' 7, when in fact what they are saying is 2 + 3 'ought' to be 7, because they would like it to be 7. The "Says who?" test makes sure that we uncover these deceptions. That we ensure 2 + 3 = 5, irrespective of what someone would like it to be, or thinks it ought to be, because it suits his purpose.

Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832)

Bentham is the most appropriate place to begin an investigation into the origins of the Liberal Fundamentalist State because he epitomizes its 'thinking'. Also, most people are familiar with the term Utilitarianism, and the phrase coined by Bentham to popularize his philosophy, "the greatest happiness to the greatest number."

"The pursuit of happiness" is also one of the fundamental Rights enshrined in the American Declaration of Independence, and the cornerstone of Bentham's thinking. [Now I am not claiming that Bentham had a part to play in that formulation. His book on the subject was actually printed 4 years after the Declaration of Independence. Locke had more influence on the Founding Fathers. It is the evolution of the 'happiness' formula that I am concerned with here.]

Bentham was undoubtedly the architect of the Liberal Fundamentalist State, so understanding Bentham's ideology is crucial to understanding Liberal Fundamentalism, and why today there is such contempt for our traditional values and principles, and why the West has so whole-heartedly embraced the 'me' mentality. He is principally to blame for the Dark Age of ignorance and decadence, despair and repression, which characterize the present condition of Western civilization.

Bentham was one of the most pernicious philosophers of recent times because he sought to strip man of all morality, reducing him to a programmable machine, and worse, because he handed to government the instruments of oppression, which we see wielded on a daily basis.

How to sum up Bentham?

He sought to travel back in time to the Garden of Eden, just before Adam and Eve were placed in it. To then sneak in, uproot the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and plant in its place the tree of pleasure and pain. And it is of this tree, claims Bentham, that Adam and Eve ate, not the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Bentham, of course, does not put it in that way, but that is the effect of his philosophy. Man does not make decisions based on good and evil, because Bentham dug up that tree, but on the basis of pleasure and pain. And the 'philosophical calculator' is programmed accordingly.

Bentham even talks of a "moral arithmetic," and "felicific calculus." Felicific, by the way, means happy. A happy calculus, or arithmetic. So Bentham consciously tries to invent the 'philosophical calculator', or 'moral calculator'.

Bentham even tries to pre-empt the "Says who?" test. He denies that his principle of utility makes 2 + 3 = 7. He says this. "Is it susceptible of any direct proof? It should seem not: for that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless."(6)

So what is it that he claims is so watertight?

It is this. "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve only to demonstrate and confirm it."(7)

Bentham then constructs his "principle of utility" on the basis that man is ruled by pleasure and pain.

And what is this principle? "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question."(8)

Then Bentham claims this. "A thing is said to promote the interest, or be for the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasure: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains."(9)

So, for Bentham, man's sole motivation is a desire for pleasure, and avoidance of pain, so as to maximize his happiness. Right and wrong, for the individual, and the community, must be measured by this, and this alone.

By everyone pursuing their own happiness, argues Bentham, a process of 'diffusion' takes place in which each adjusts his pursuit of happiness to others doing the same, which creates a kind of social happiness which benefits all.

Now, on the face of it, Bentham has come up with an absolute postulate. But before I subject it to the "says who?" test, I should demonstrate Bentham's cunning. He is a master illusionist.

No one can dispute that man feels pleasure and pain, and that ordinarily pleasure is preferable to pain. But, under Bentham's formulation, even pain should be capable of being pleasure. I may suffer pain in the belief that by doing so I attain some higher spiritual consciousness, which gives me pleasure. I may make tremendous sacrifice of my own wellbeing and security for the sole benefit of someone else. I may sacrifice my own life for the benefit of another, because the honor of doing so gives me 'pleasure', or I couldn't live with the shame, or 'pain', of acting in a way I consider dishonorable. Or, like the Buddhists, I meditate to free myself from the 'bondage' of pleasure and pain, and indeed all physical manifestations of life, in order to attain nirvana, a state of pure spiritual being.

Put in this way, we can see that the pleasure/pain formulation is nothing more than asserting that man always acts as a selfish being. It is impossible to conceive of a situation where a selfish motive cannot be ascribed to a man's actions, because the very decision to act has to originate within himself. And he always has a motive for taking the action. So even those actions we describe as selfless are selfish in the sense that they are those we choose because they give us most 'reward', or 'pleasure'. Thus, even consciously seeking pain, or denying myself pleasure, should fall within Bentham's definition, because I do it for some purpose which I believe will ultimately be to my benefit.

And then there's the extreme situation of the man who can no longer face another day of his 'high pleasure' diet, and takes leave of the world. He prefers the ultimate pain, death, to a pointless treadmill of pleasure. To him, death is preferable to such a life. As Schweitzer said, "every thinking human being makes acquaintance with this thought."(10) Except, it seems, Bentham.

So, in reality, the pleasure/pain formulation is nothing more than stating the obvious: we make decisions which we think are right for us. And a decision which we consider right may result in a great deal of pain for us, even death, but we are still motivated to take it because it gives us peace of mind. As we would say, "I couldn't have lived with myself otherwise." If Bentham was true to his premise, he should have included all this under 'pleasure' which leads to happiness.

And mostly, such decisions are made on the basis of a man's estimation of his purpose, in the first place, of being on this lump of rock hurtling through space.

Put in this way, Bentham's theory looks distinctly odd. Pleasure is also pain, and pain is also pleasure; self-sacrifice is also self-fulfillment and self-fulfillment is also self-sacrifice; happiness is sadness and sadness is happiness; selfishness is also selflessness and selflessness is also selfishness.

Suddenly, we have a hall of mirrors. We can no longer do the arithmetic, because 4 becomes 3, and 2 becomes 5, and so on.

Bentham could just as well have formulated his pleasure/pain theory by saying simply, 'man is selfish'. Sometimes self-sacrifice leads to self-fulfillment; sometimes man deliberately seeks pain, or rids himself of pleasure, for some purpose other than pleasure in the physical or intellectual sense; sometimes he even finds being at permanent rest preferable to the constant pursuit of 'pleasure' or 'happiness'.

But, for Bentham, the problem with such a formula is that the "felicific calculus" wouldn't add up. His calculator would not be programmable. Punch in 5, and up pops 3; punch in 2, and up pops 4.

The only way that Bentham can make it add up is to stick rigidly to definitions of pleasure and pain in the physical sense, by which I include intellectual. And to do so, Bentham has to strip man of any 'knowledge' of good and evil, right and wrong. Man can have no faculty to question his existence on earth. He must relentlessly seek pleasure and avoid pain, without regard to why he is supposedly "under the governance" by them in the first place.

So the first thing he does is to declare "that whatever principle differs from [the principle of utility] in any case must necessarily be a wrong one."(11)

And he identifies two wrong ones: "asceticism" and "sympathy and antipathy."(12)

He then uses these 'wrong principles' to neutralize any non-physical aspirations man may possess. Because man can only act in pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Bentham decrees that man is incapable of objectively evaluating pleasure and pain within the context of reflecting on the meaning of life itself, because he is "under the governance" of pleasure and pain.

So under "asceticism", there are those who invert the pursuit of pleasure by "approving of actions in as far as they tend to diminish his happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they tend to augment it."(13)

And ascetics fall under two categories: "moralists" and "religionists."(14)

Moralists, claims Bentham, are more philosophical and base their courting of pain on "hope", which is the prospect of pleasure, whereas the religionists base theirs of the prospect of pain, "the fear of future punishment at the hands of a splenetic and revengeful Deity."(15)

The moralists are more refined and less extreme, focusing on cleansing themselves "from the sordes of [their] impure original", that is, their most base impulses to satisfy carnal pleasures.(16)

The religionists, as Bentham calls them, "make it a matter of merit and of duty to court pain."(17)

Bentham then does a little inverting of his own. He claims that some of this inverting of the principle of utility has rubbed off on man, some of whom have adopted elements of this perverse thinking. "Men of education more frequently from the philosophical [the moralists], as more suited to the elevation of their sentiments: the vulgar more frequently from the superstitious [religionists], as more suited to the narrowness of their intellect, undiluted by knowledge and to the abjectness of their condition, continually open to the attacks of fear."(18)

From that statement we can see the origins of contempt for religion, especially Christianity and Judaism, which now prevail in Western societies. 'Intellectuals' are too smart for religion. Subscribing to religion demonstrates "the narrowness of [one's] intellect." It is today a 'badge of intelligence' to ridicule the religious as being of 'a narrow intellect'. And here is the origin!

The other principle which Bentham argues is adverse to his principle of utility is "sympathy and antipathy."(19) In short, these, argues Bentham, don't originate from any "extrinsic ground", but from prejudice. We approve or disapprove of certain actions "not on account of their tending to augment the happiness, nor yet on account of their tending to diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them."(20)

And to make such a determination, says Bentham, we "take counsel of our own feelings: whatever you find in yourself a propensity to condemn, is wrong for that very reason."(21) Those who do so, claims Bentham, do so to convince others to accept their "sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself" in condoning or condemning any particular action.(22)

Here then, is the origin of the current tendency to brand opinions 'bigoted' because they do not measure up to Liberal Fundamentalist doctrine.

Bentham, of course, simply refuses to even entertain the possibility that we may instinctively know something to be right or wrong. The fact that across the world, by people who never before had contact with one another, certain "feelings" were discovered to have been shared, does not enter Bentham's 'thinking'. Any such instinct does not comply with his principle of utility, so it "must necessarily be a wrong one."(23)

And here is where Bentham hands the state another instrument of oppression, oppression by indoctrination, and punishment for harboring the wrong sort of "feelings".

Re-education, or punishment, of 'bigotry'.

He says this: "Antipathy or resentment must always be regulated, to prevent it doing mischief: to be regulated by what? Always by the principle of utility. The principle of utility neither requires nor admits of any other regulator than itself."(24)

So let me summarize very briefly where Bentham has taken us so far.

Since Bentham's pleasure/pain formula can only operate if limited to physical (sensual and intellectual), pleasures and pains, he has to banish pleasure which can discover itself in pain. He must also banish all notions of self-sacrifice leading to self-fulfillment. He must deny man the ability of rising above pleasure and pain, of detaching himself from them, to ask why, or whether, he is "under [their] governance" in the first place. He must deny man the possibility of finding awareness, or in the case of Buddhism, nirvana, independent of pleasure and pain. He must deny man the ability of finding his life by losing it. And especially, any "feelings", or intuitions, or instincts, which may pollute the minds of men, leading them to reach beyond pleasure and pain, "must always be regulated, to prevent [them] doing mischief."(25)

So far then, Bentham has done this. Stripped man of any morality. Branded religion the ideology of those of a narrow intellect. Declared any feeling, or intuition, that something may be in itself wrong, 'bigotry'. And handed government the instruments to 'regulate' out of man any such feelings, because they do not conform to his principle of utility.

I trust that anyone reading this will see where Bentham is going!

But let's see where he takes us anyway. But I should caution that it is quite frightening.

In Chapter 5 Bentham sets out the kinds of pleasure and pain which he claims govern man. Fourteen pleasures of sense, wealth, skill, amity, good name, power, piety, benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, pleasures dependent on association, and relief, something felt after enduring some pain.(26)

There are twelve Bentham pains. Privation, senses, awkwardness, enmity, ill name, piety, benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation and pains dependent on association.(27) In other words, pain is nothing more than denial of pleasure, in one way or another.

In Chapter 6 Bentham 'reveals' to us that different men experience different quantities of pleasure or pain depending on their "disposition"(28), and some will obtain more pleasure from more of a certain kind of pleasure than others. So someone will obtain more pleasure when he has, say, larger doses of the pleasures of benevolence and piety, while another from  large doses of wealth, power and malevolence; and we all know the sort who enjoy the latter.

At this point, Benham adopts what I can only call the 'law of diffusion'. Once you stick a person seeking to maximize his pleasure, in amongst a whole lot of other people doing the same, we end up with some getting hurt, experiencing pain, because of others pursuing their pleasures. But, argues Bentham, by this process of diffusion, most people temper their pursuit of pleasure to avoid inflicting pain on others. Somehow, they deny themselves their full quota of pleasure in case it causes pain to someone else. Presumably, this generates some sort of pleasure as compensation?

But the 'law of diffusion' is not perfect. Sometimes oil is poured into the water as well as dye. So not only do we get a hideous gray, we get oil floating on top. And the oil needs to be burned off.

And this is where Bentham hands government the electrodes. One for the infusion of pleasure, the other for inflicting pain.

"The business of government is to promote the happiness of society, by punishing and rewarding. That part of its business which consists in punishing, is more particularly the subject of penal law. In proportion as an act tends to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency is pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punishment. What happiness consists of we have already seen: enjoyment of pleasures, security from pains."(29)

Having handed government the instruments of oppression, the electrodes, Bentham then sets about devising a system of indoctrination and punishment to assist government in achieving what he has decreed is the object of humankind: happiness. His idea of happiness. Which if not voluntarily embraced, must be imposed by the electrodes.

Bentham is the interrogator who assesses the victim's "disposition" so as to inform the torturers of his strengths and weaknesses. The torturers then apply the pleasure/pain electrodes in the guise of good cop/bad cop. The result? Everyone happy, in conformity with his principle of utility.

And so 'revelations' of the human condition come fast and furious: sometimes man acts with "intention, with regard to the consequences of an act,"(30) which makes it bad because it has an "evil tendency."(31) Sometimes the act itself can be innocent, but the consequences bad because they hurt someone. Then the consciousness of the consequences of the act must be determined: should the person have foreseen the consequences, and so on. Basically, Chapters 8 and 9 deal with intention, recklessness and negligence. But Bentham needs these to assist government in effectively applying the electrodes.

In general, there is nothing offensive in his analysis if taken independently of his general 'philosophy'. It is taking these things together which produces the hideous effects of Liberal Fundamentalism.

"Now, pleasure is in itself a good: nay, even setting aside immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil; and, indeed, without exception, the only evil; or else the words good and evil have no meaning. And this is alike true of every sort of pain, and of every sort of pleasure. It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestably, that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one."(32)

Things are only good or bad "on account of their effects: good, on account of their tendency to produce pleasure, or avert pain: bad on account of their tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure."(33)

Bentham follows this great 'revelation' with examples. One is a comparison between "a man [who] ravishes a virgin," and the same man who "exercises the rights of marriage with his wife." Although we regard the first as bad, and the second as good, or at least indifferent, "in both cases it may be neither more nor less than sexual desire."(34) Both are fulfilling sexual pleasure, so good. Motive is good, because it is to indulge in pleasure, and remember, pleasure good, pain, or denial of pleasure, bad.

 So motives only become bad when taken in context of their effects. "If any sort of motive then can, in consideration of its effects, be termed with any propriety a bad one, it can only be with reference to the balance of all the effects it may have had of both kinds within a given period, that is, of its most usual tendency."(35)

So, says Bentham, "we see the emptiness of all those rhapsodies of commonplace morality, which consist in the taking of such names as lust, cruelty, and avarice, and branding them with marks of reprobation."(36)

Having said all this, Bentham himself poses the question: "Is there nothing then about a man that may properly be termed good and bad, when, on such or such an occasion, he suffers himself to be governed by such or such a motive?"

"Yes", says Bentham, "certainly: his disposition."(37)

But before we take a great sigh of relief, let us hear what he means by disposition.

"It is with disposition as with every thing else: it will be good or bad according to its effects: according to the effects it has in augmenting or diminishing the happiness of the community."(38)

Bentham then spends some 43 numbered paragraphs explaining how to measure a man's disposition. And it comes down to this: some men are unable to control their enthusiasm to indulge their pleasures, and will even intentionally harm others to do so. Others will be indifferent to the harm. Others will derive pleasure specifically from causing harm. Some cannot resist the "temptation" held out by the prospect of large quantities of pleasure, so will indulge themselves, even though they know it will have the effect of causing pain to others. Others still will succumb to low "temptation", small dollops of pleasure, even where the effects will be catastrophic for others. Bentham deals with "temptation" at Chapter 11 (40) to (43). It's worth reading for a laugh!

By mixing up all these considerations, the "depravity" of a man's disposition can be measured, and so also, the amount of current to be applied by the electrodes which Bentham handed to government.(39)

This is how Bentham describes it. "We now come to speak of the consequences or tendency: an article which forms the concluding link in all this chain of causes and effects, involving in it the materiality of the whole."(40)

Having determined "tendency," Bentham says, "we now come to speak of punishment."(41) This is where governments rub their hands with glee: this is what they have been salivating for.

I will not waste time exploring the 'technicalities' of 'punishment according to Bentham'. In short, Bentham says punishment should be used to compel people of a mischievous disposition to act in accordance with the principle of utility. But since people can only seek pleasure, which is good, this means that government must apply the electrodes to modify, or curb, a particular persons enthusiasm for certain pleasures. It does this by applying the 'pain electrode' in such quantity as Bentham has determined, or applying the 'pleasure electrode' to displace, so to speak, a persons enthusiasm for one particular form of pleasure, and supplant it with another. The new pleasure must have the effect of neutralizing, or at least diminishing, the harmful effects of the particularly enthusiastic 'pleasure seeker' by enticing him to indulge in pleasures that are less likely to produce harmful effects. Entice a rapist, who is doing nothing more than seeking the pleasures of sex (pleasure good, remember), with say indulging himself in the pleasures of drink (pleasure good, remember), because the effects of seeking pleasure in drink will likely be less harmful to others than his appetite for sexual pleasure.

Now the best thing I can say about Bentham is that he was trying to keep everyone happy. But, as someone said, 'I don't know the secret of success, but I do know that the secret of failure is trying to keep everyone happy'.

But even if we attribute a benign 'motive' to Bentham, the 'effect', or 'consequence', of his hideous ideology has been to dismantle humanity and hand to the State the instruments of oppression. He reduces man to a species lower than Pavlov's dogs, then hands to government not a bell, as used by Pavlov to make his dogs salivate, but electrodes. Electrodes which government can use, and does use, to impose on mankind what it determines is morality, however depraved, however destructive, however oppressive.

Yet, even after Bentham had locked man in his cage of pleasures and pains, he refused to contemplate that man may, even at the level of a beast, yearn for the vast, open expanses of the plains; the freedom of the savanna. Even though, on the plains, he would be exposed to the prospect of more pain than pleasure, and even death itself. 'How', I can hear Bentham asking in frustration, 'could 'man the beast' seek the uncertainty of the open, dangerous plain, when I have given him all the pleasures he needs right here in his cage?' He becomes even more agitated when the electrodes government applies make man salivate, like Pavlov's dogs, but not abandon their yearning for the open plains. 'What an ungrateful lot', I can hear him screaming from the grave. Or, in Bentham's case, from the cabinet in the main building of the University of London where he wanted, and got, his skeleton preserved, dressed in his own clothes, surmounted by a wax head (students played football with the real one).

I should here summarize the effects of this part of Bentham's 'thinking'. As long as man is seeking pleasure, and avoiding pain, in pursuit of his happiness, he is doing good. There is no other good or bad; Bentham dug up that tree. Any revulsion felt by some, even most, people for certain pursuits of pleasure, are bigotry which derive from the "narrowness of their intellect" because of their religion, or from their "feelings", which have no rational basis. Accordingly, anything can only be regarded as "bad" or "evil" in light of the effect which it has on others, or on the community as a whole: the effect of inflicting pain, or interfering with pleasure. And so Bentham hands government the electrodes to "regulate" man to act in accordance with his "principle of utility." Man will be happy!

From these foundations has been constructed western society as we know it: the 'me' generation relentlessly pursuing pleasure, or happiness, in the certain conviction that it is "good". Any "feelings" we have which gnaw at our conscious can be dispelled, as long as we can show that the effects are not interfering with the pleasure of others. Hence we see the constant stream of 'studies' showing this or that action, or pleasure, does not cause others or the community any harm. And so Bentham kicked down the door to the chambers of decadence and depravity, and most people swarmed in. Even then though, certain cubicles were off-limits: bestiality, incest, pedophilia and so on. "Feelings" still got in the way, so, by convoluted 'argument', and 'studies', government "regulated" them to prevent them doing 'harm'. But the way was clear for others: promiscuity, adultery, abortion, women working in the 'certain knowledge' that the effects are positive on their children ('studies' show that), homosexuality, adoption by homosexuals, and so on. And I list those without pronouncing judgment on them.

The whole rationale of advertising is also based on the Bentham view of life. For having convinced the majority of people that the indulgence in pleasure is good, advertising can capitalize on it, feeding the pleasure seekers.

I can hear some exclaim that the effectiveness of advertising thus surely proves Bentham's point. It does not. That is like saying because laxatives are effective on the digestive system, it is governed by them.

But since most people are now so absolutely secure in their conviction that the Bentham view of life is the right view, and that is the way we live and are governed today, we should consider whether the foundations for that belief are justified. Or as justified as we have been led to believe.

If we apply the "who says?" test to the first part of Bentham's theory, the pleasure/pain formula, we see it doesn't stack up. Who says that mankind was placed under the governance of pleasure and pain? We are no more under the governance of pleasure and pain, than under the governance of the sun, or the moon, or the wind, or wild animals, or our digestive systems.

Pleasure and pain are simply incidents of life with which man has to contend, like any other incidents. Each man will assess what he is presented with, consider it, then decide on how to respond. Pleasure and pain suggest two possible reactions, out of many. I am lost, and presented with two different directions I could take. I do not decide on the basis of pleasure and pain, I decide on what my best assessment is of the right direction.  

These are instances of survival. They do not dictate to us how to behave. We perceive them, analyze them, then react to them. And everyone will react differently. Most of us, or at least some of us, ask what we are doing on this earth. Why do we feel pleasure and pain? Is it simply to indulge pleasure and avoid pain, or are those conditions something we should use to find something more meaningful? If we can question those impulses, and even conquer them, we can't be under their governance. We are under the influence of the law of gravity, but we are not governed by it. We discovered that we could defy it by unraveling the laws of aerodynamics. The mere fact that we can, and do, question our appetite for pleasure, defies their governance of us. Some of us even reflect on them in the search for meaning in life, a meaning beyond feeding those appetites.

Not Bentham! He wants to impose on man amoebic instincts: jab it and it recoils; put it under a glowing light and it flourishes. Bentham needs our reaction to stimuli to be an amoebic reaction to stimuli. Only then can it be measured. Only then can the electrodes function effectively. Only then does government have the whip hand.

So he randomly chooses pleasure and pain, then boldly asserts that they govern us; much like primitive societies asserted that the sun was a God which governed over them, and had to be kept happy, even by human sacrifice; in the common good of course. Even then, there is probably more truth to the sun God theory than to Bentham's utility. Without the sun, there is no life. Without happiness, life goes on.

So Bentham's cunning was to choose two incidents of life which we can all agree affect man's decision making, and assert, without any persuasive argument, that they govern us. By this slight of hand he constructs his fanciful theory around a fallacy.

But even if his first premise were correct, it wouldn't lead to the second. Let's put it to the "who says?" test.

Who says that because we are governed by pleasure and pain, we will always choose to maximize our pleasure to produce happiness? That's like saying because a car runs on fuel, it's only purpose is to consume fuel.

It's just silly!

When examined closely, it is clear that Bentham is simply asserting that man wants to be happy. He assets the answer. It is 7.

He then tries to fit the arithmetic to the answer. Pleasure (2) minus pain (1). Unfortunately, the answer is 1. But even his 2 - 1 is not arithmetic. There is no addition or subtraction. Pleasure and pain are nothing more than selfishness. Selfishness in the sense that we can only act by making a decision for ourselves on what is presented us. So there is no 2 - 1, only a 1.

To sum up then, Bentham strips man of morality, of any knowledge of good and evil, and substitutes in him the most basic animal instincts, which, by a process of osmosis, permeate society, and diffuse with the collective animal instinct, thus endowing society with its own special moral content which, in turn, invigorates the individual to achieve higher degrees of happiness.

And in reserve are the electrodes for those who malfunction.

But it's all illusion.

Schweitzer, with his wonderful insight, describes Bentham like this: "in order to find his explanation for the altruistic, he puts out of action the ethical personality which is in man, and, to compensate for this, raises society to an ethical personality that he may then by a transmission of energy connect individuals with this central power-station."(42)

But Schweitzer is too generous. Bentham doesn't connect man to the central power-station; he connects him to the electrodes.

So Bentham doesn't even come close to passing the "Says who?" test. His philosophy is 'Bentham says'. And his arithmetic is hopeless. He wants 2 - 1 to be 7. It isn't. 2 - 1 = 1, not 7. And even 2 - 1 is an illusion. It was only ever 1.

He certainly doesn't establish an absolute postulate. His premise is a joke! But it's a joke that successive Western governments have been happy to subscribe to. Because it suits them! It vests in them the power to determine and dictate morality.

And Bentham, as I have shown, spawned the hideous ideology of Liberal Fundamentalism by reducing man's motivations to the most primitive carnal instincts, and blessing the pursuit of those instincts as a noble and moral endeavor which would enhance the wellbeing of all. In reality though, he and his followers have created self-absorbed, self-centered generations of deceitful, dishonest, ignorant and decadent morons, who believe that doing as they please is some kind of moral prerogative.

The rest of the Utilitarians fare little better. John Stuart Mill, for example, 'refined' Bentham's "pain and pleasure" premise to distinguish between higher and lower pleasures. Educated people, argued Mill, valued intellectual and aesthetic pleasures more than sensual pleasures, so they should have more worth. Enough said of him!!

Mill, by the way, first dubbed this thinking "utilitarian".

Before I finish with a brief look at Bentham's predecessors, Hobbes and Locke, I think it incumbent on me to explain why I have used the highly charged word "fundamentalist" to describe Western government.

Fundamentalism is the belief in a fundamental principle, which permits no deviation. It is associated with Christian Fundamentalism, and Islamic Fundamentalism, amongst others. It requires unwavering 'faith' in the truth of what is asserted. And that is exactly what Bentham does. Any principle in conflict with his principle of utility "must necessarily be a wrong one."

And those who oppose it are branded with insults: narrow intellects, bigots, homophobic, Neanderthals, intolerant, and even fundamentalist. A case of the pot calling the kettle black.

So I come to Hobbes and Locke. Locke is especially important because of the influence he had on the Founding Fathers in the United States.

Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679)

Hobbes, we recall, described the life of man as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."(43) So Hobbes calls the State to the rescue. Because man, left to himself, will always screw up. He will always put his self-interest first, thus missing out on true prosperity. So man, or the majority of men, agree to humble themselves before the State by means of mutual agreement, or contract, so that the State can decide what is best for them, and put them to work in pursuit of the common good, and prosperity.

So, here we go again with the "Says who?" test. Does Hobbes pass?

Of course not! He doesn't even get off the ground.

It is difficult to even discern an absolute postulate in Hobbes' postulating.

He seems to be saying something along these lines.

Because man is too stupid and selfish to act in his own long term interests, he gets together with a lot of other stupid, selfish men, so as to elect a select few other stupid, selfish men, to compel him to act in his own best long term interest. And this, claims Hobbes, will just happen to coincide with the best interest of all the people, and so enhance the prosperity of all.

How the collective stupidity of the many, selecting a stupid few to represent them, transforms the collective stupidity into a unitary, benign wisdom, he doesn't quite explain.

Why a stupid, self-interested few should metamorphose into selfless beings endowed with wisdom, and knowledge, and understanding, dedicated to the welfare and prosperity of the many, is a mystery.

Is it, I venture to speculate, that responsibility for the wellbeing of others has this transforming effect? Can it be, that endowing a few selfish, stupid men with power will humble them to self-sacrifice, and unselfish devotion to others?

I suspect not. But, make no mistake about it, governments, again, love the idea. And those in power certainly proclaim their altruistic devotion. But it's a deceit. Pure and simple.

Hobbes has a quite frightening faith in government. "Hereby it is manifest that during time when men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man."(44)

But I can't finish with Hobbes without citing an example of his lunacy in full flow. "The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it."(45)

If no man knows what should be forbidden by law, how does the act of selecting one of their number to decide what actions the law should forbid endow that person with that knowledge? Incredible!!

But what we see in Hobbes are the germs of Bentham's principle of utility. Bentham refines Hobbes to transform the crude, stupid, selfishness man into a creature in search of pleasure, and gives to government an explanation and calculus to help it regulate society. Bentham gives a formula for government to use when applying the electrodes; Hobbes doesn't.

John Locke (1632 - 1704)

Next comes Locke. Just mention his name and the constitutionalists fall to their knees in reverence.

But did he find the elusive absolute postulate, the holy grail?

Locke tries to patch up some of Hobbes' shortcomings. Whereas Hobbes claimed that man only acted to the benefit of others when compelled to do so by the State and society, and had no capacity for this in himself, Locke does find some natural rights belonging to man which stand independent of the State. For these he looks to God. Locke was a religious man.

Yet Locke took the same stance as Hobbes. That man is compelled by the State and society to act in the common good, to be altruistic, but he also mobilizes God who, by dispensing rewards and punishments in eternity, further knocks some sense into man to act in the common good.

As Schweitzer says, "The essential point of distinction between them is that with Hobbes society alone plies the whip, while with Locke God and society wield it together."(46)

Hobbes and Locke both subscribe to the 'social contract' theory. But in Locke's case he says that man possesses certain additional natural rights, which, if breached by the State, entitle man to change the government.

I consider Locke much more fully when I examine the problem of government in my paper on jurisprudence, but should introduce a couple of matters here.

Locke says, "I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other." He then goes on to define civil government as "a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their civil interests." And Locke defines civil interests as "life, liberty, health, and indolence of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like." And as to those outward things, Locke says that the State "cannot take away these worldly things from this man or party and give them to that; nor change propriety amongst fellow subjects (no not even by a law)."(47)

So for Locke, man's altruism cannot be completely forced upon him by the State. Mostly, altruism comes from religion. The exception for Locke is tolerance, what he calls the "Law of Toleration". This, according to Locke, is an altruism, if it can be called such, which should be the business of the State, subject to those things which should not be tolerated, such as, according to Locke, atheism.

Locke was, of course, extremely influential on the Founding Fathers in America, and much of his 'philosophy' we see lived out today in the United States.

Yet, in spite of the considerable contribution made by Locke in limiting the power of government, does he pass the "says who?" test?

The answer is no.

Who says that man's civil interests are what he says they are? On religion, there are many religions, so which one? And why "believe" in the first place? Must we just have "faith"?

Locke doesn't come anywhere near to establishing an absolute postulate. He does, however, make a great contribution in suggesting ways in which the enthusiasm of governments to impose altruism on their citizens could be curbed. It's just a pity that no one thought to take up his suggestions, no, not even the Founding Fathers of the United States Constitution in this instance, as I will show in my next paper.

So, although Locke elevated the United States above other Western governments in protecting the liberty of the individual, by separating the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the subsequent influence of Bentham is like a tidal wave washing over western societies and governments. And, even in the United States, finding every crack in the defenses to hand government the electrodes of regulation.

And so has been created the modern Liberal Fundamentalist State with its obsession of pursuing pleasure. An amoral society paralyzed by the electrodes of utility.

Conclusion

So how did we allow ourselves to be stripped of morality and humble ourselves at the tree of pleasure and pain?

Schweitzer put it better than I ever could.

"Every year the spread of opinions which have no thought behind them is carried forward by the masses, and the methods of this process have been so perfected, and met with such a ready welcome, that our confidence in being able to raise to the dignity of public opinion the silliest of statements, wherever it seems expedient to get them currently accepted, has no need to justify itself before acting."(48)

And this: "The general determination of society has put freedom of thought out of fashion, because the majority renounce the priviledge of thinking as free personalities, and let themselves be guided in everything by those who belong to the various groups and cliques."(49)

That, I suggest, perfectly sums up the Liberal Fundamentalist State of today, and the methods for preserving it. And education, or perhaps more properly indoctrination, secures its future by putting "freedom of thought out of fashion."

So the principle of utility is entrenched by the mobilization of vacuous and contorted injunctions to tolerance, diversity, equality, social justice, and the like, even though we have no firm foundations, or indeed any, on which to found the principle of utility in the first place.


Footnotes

1 Albert Schweitzer, The Decay and Restoration of Civilization, Second Edition, 1932, Adam and Charles Black.

2 Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, Third Edition, 1946, Adam and Charles Black.

3 Civilization and Ethics, ibid, page 23.

4 Civilization and Ethics, ibid, page 26.

5 Proverbs 22:5. Kink James Version.

6 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of  Morals and Legislation, 1 (11). All references to Bentham are by Chapter number, followed by paragraph number in brackets. Bentham used Roman numerals. I use numbers.

7 Ibid 1(1).

8 Ibid 1(2).

9 Ibid, 1(5).

10 Civilization and Ethics, ibid, page 210

11 Jeremy Bentham, ibid, 2(1).

12 Jeremy Bentham, ibid, 2(2).

13 Ibid, 2(3).

14 Ibid, 2(5).

15 Ibid, 2(5).

16 Ibid, 2(6).

17 Ibid, 2(6).

18 Ibid, 2(7).

19 Ibid, 2(11).

20 Ibid, 2(11).

21 Ibid, 2(13).

22 Ibid, 2(14).

23 Ibid, 2(1).

24 Ibid, 2(14).

25 Ibid, 2(14).

26 Ibid, 5(2).

27 Ibid, 5(3).

28 Ibid, 6(2).

29 Ibid, 7(1).

30 Ibid, 7(5).

31 Ibid, 7(1).

32 Ibid, 10(10).

33 Ibid, 10(12).

34 Ibid, 10(16).

35 Ibid, 10(24).

36 Ibid, 10(30).

37 Ibid, 11(1).

38 Ibid, 11(2).

39 Ibid, 11(43).

40 Ibid, 12(1).

41 Ibid, 12(36).

42 Civilization and Ethics, ibid, page 79.

43 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathian, ch 13.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Civilization and Ethics, ibid, page 76

47 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 1689.

48 The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization, ibid, page 31.

49 Ibid, page 31.


Copyright Š Joseph B.H. McMillan 2005 All Rights Reserved

 

Click here to purchase Freedom v. A Tyranny of Rights from Amazon.com.

 

Home | Articles  | Books | Biography | Contact

CopyrightŠEscaping Books, S.L. and Joseph B.H. McMillan,2007